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This paper presents a novel flight safety assessment and management augmentation to the flight management
systemdesigned to assist a flight crew in avoiding or recovering from impending loss-of-control situations.Nominally,
this system serves as a passive monitor but, in high-risk situations, warnings and (ultimately) override actions are
initiated to mitigate the high-risk situation. In this work, flight safety assessment and management is applied to the
task of preserving safety during takeoff, which is one of the highest-risk phases of flight. Flight safety assessment and
management is specified as a deterministic Moore machine that can ultimately be certified using existing software
certification processes. To facilitate understanding and to reduce state-space complexity, flight safety assessment and
management’s state machines are split into longitudinal and lateral-directional submachines that identify and
mitigate loss-of-control contributing factors associated with aircraft dynamics and control constraints. Case studies
based ondocumented takeoff accidents are presented to evaluate flight safety assessment andmanagement’s ability to
maintain safe flight in realistic loss-of-control scenarios. Results from these case studies illustrate that flight safety
assessment and management could have averted the takeoff accidents that were considered. A discussion of other
factors thatmust be consideredbefore realizing a comprehensive flight safety assessment andmanagement capability
for takeoff is provided.
Nomenclature
Alg = longitudinal takeoff logic
Alt = lateral takeoff logic
ap = envelope aware autopilot control
CL, CD = lift and drag coefficients
h = altitude
p, q, r = angular rates
p = pilot control
T,W = thrust and weight
u, v, w = velocities in the body frame
V = true airspeed
V lof = liftoff speed
VR = takeoff rotation speed
V1 = takeoff decision speed
X = longitudinal position on runway
Y = lateral position on runway
y = crosstrack error
α, β, γ = angle of attack, sideslip angle, and flight-path angle
δa, δr = aileron and rudder inputs
ρ, μ, Sref = atmospheric density, friction coefficient, and planform area
ϕ, θ, ψ = roll, pitch, and yaw angles
I. Introduction
L OSSof control (LOC) is the leading cause of commercial aviation accidents today.Although common contributors exist, many causal factorsthat have historically led to LOC are a function of the type of aircraft, avionics design, crew behavior, weather conditions, and phase of flight
[1]. LOC during takeoff can be attributed to several factors such as improper takeoff configuration, delayed execution of rejected takeoff
procedures, engine failures during takeoff, bird strikes, severe crosswinds, etc. Such circumstancesmay result in aircraft stall after takeoff, runway
overrun, or excursion off the side of the runway. Today, flight management decisions are made by the flight crew, with the exception of certain
envelope protection logic to prevent events such as pilot-induced stall given a nominally functioning aircraft [2–4]. During failure, damage, or
other exceptional events, decisions have to be made within a short time window, as the wrong decisions could lead to an accident. Current flight-
deck automation provides substantial data to the flight crew and augments the manual decision-making process. In case of emergency, however,
current systemsmay fail to provide critical information. For example, current flight management systems (FMSs)were not designed to provide an
assessment of risks associated with the current flight conditions and control choices, nor do they inform the flight crew about possible actions that
would improve safety of flight, except in specific cases such as the traffic collision-avoidance system [3,5,6]. Such information is vital to guide the
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flight crew in the decision-making process during emergencies, particularly when the workload is high and real-time safety-critical decisions are
required.
Flight safety assessment and management (FSAM) is part of the envelope-aware (EA) flight management system (EA-FMS) originally
proposed in our previous work [7] (see Fig. 1). The EA-FMS consists of modules including FSAM [7,8], adaptive planning and guidance [9],
Envelope estimation [10], system identification [11] and adaptive control [12]. FSAM is designed to constantly monitor flight conditions for
anomalies and to assess risks associated with the current flight conditions. FSAMwarns the flight crewwhen risk is present and, if the flight crew
does not respond with appropriate control actions in time to assure recovery, FSAM overrides with the EA-FMS until the LOC risk is mitigated.
FSAM is effectively a “watchdog” system with LOC avoidance override capabilities such as flight envelope protection (FEP) [3], in a more
general context.
For takeoff, LOC translates to a situation in which the aircraft veers off the side of the runway, overshoots the runway, or leaves the ground in a
condition (e.g., insufficient speed/inappropriate rotation attitude) that introduces substantial risk in the subsequent departure climb. The work
presented in this paper contributes a deterministic decision-making framework that addresses the aforementionedLOC factors in a holisticmanner
with an approach that can be certified using existing processes in DO-178B or DO-178C [13]. The deterministic Moore machines (DMMs) [14]
realizing FSAM in this paper characterize the evolution of aircraft states to support safe takeoff decisionswith FSAMwarning or override to avoid
LOC risk. The DMMs are formulated based on analysis of aviation accident surveys, accident/incident reports, flight data obtained from the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) accident database [15,16], aircraft operating manuals, pilot handbooks, checklist procedures, and
flight control laws from the literature [2–4]. Furthermore, this paper introduces envelopes for the takeoff phase that enable the identification of safe
and unsafe states. Note that a discussion of suitable human–machine interfaces that couldmake use of FSAM to improve the situational awareness
of the flight crew is beyond the scope of this paper. This work assumes that the aircraft dynamics and the relevant flight envelopes remain static
throughout takeoff. Consequently, this work does not illustrate the interactions between the various subsystems and the full capability of the
EA-FMS.
Section II surveys related literature, whereas Sec. III provides a discussion of factors that contribute toLOCduring takeoff. Section IVdiscusses
the development of flight envelopes to efficiently and intuitively identify risk during takeoff. Section V presents the FSAMDMMs used to avoid
LOC during takeoff. Section VI presents case studies illustrating the application of FSAM to real-world scenarios, whereas Sec. VII discusses
results and their implications. Section VIII presents conclusions and future work required to realize a comprehensive FSAM capability.
II. Background
A. Flight Safety Architectures
Several approaches to identify and mitigate LOC risk have been investigated in the past, with most focused on providing cues to the pilot. The
safety augmentation system [17] is an automation aid to prevent entry into hazardous conditions such as unfavorable weather. It identifies flight
plan deviations and issues warning and haptic feedback upon hazard detection. Icing contamination envelope protection [18] identifies airplane
performance degradations resulting from ice contamination with online system identification and provides associated cues to pilots. The runway
overrun prevention system (ROPS) was developed by Airbus to provide warnings to the flight crew about degraded landing performance during
final approach [19].
Bak et al. [20] proposed a sandbox architecture, where an unverified controller was augmented with a safety controller and a decision module
that enabled switching to the safety controller when unsafe states were encountered. The switching strategy was obtained using hybrid systems
and optimal control principles. The sandbox architecture was conceptually similar to FSAM, although it was not used in a flight safety context.
The aircraft integrated resilient safety assurance and failsafe enhancement (AIRSAFE) [21] conceptual architecture for LOC avoidance includes
online modeling, safety assessment, and resilient control in situations with appreciable LOC risk. FSAM realizes the role of AIRSAFE’s safety
assessment and risk mitigation concepts.
Several researchers have also focused on developing individual techniques that address different aspects of LOC. For example, Govindarajan
et al. [22] proposed an optimal control framework to analyze flight control laws and estimate constraints on the reference commands. These
constraints were then used by the autopilot to ensure that the aircraft stayedwithin safe operating envelopes.McDonough et al. [10],McDonough
andKolmanovsky [23], and Lombaerts et al. [24,25] proposedmethods to estimate degrading envelope constraints under conditions such as icing.
Fig. 1 Envelope-aware flight management system architecture.































































Yu et al. [11] and Schuet et al. [26] developed system identification techniques to estimate the dynamics of an aircraft following adverse onboard
conditions. Information from these systems can be used by FSAM to make efficient decisions to prevent catastrophes.
B. Flight Safety Systems for Takeoff
Despite the safety-critical nature of takeoff, very little literature has been devoted toward LOC riskmitigation specifically for takeoff. Srivatsan
et al. [27], Milligan et al. [28], and Zammit-Mangion and Shelby. [29] proposed systems that constantly monitored takeoff ground roll
performance parameters and detected anomalies by comparing the current performance with a precomputed nominal performance profile.
Verspay andKhatwa [30] evaluated themerits of various types of takeoff performancemonitoring systems (TOPMs), aswell as characteristics of a
TOPM that improved pilot decision making during takeoff. It was found that a system with the ability to predict continued takeoff status and
stopping performance had the potential to improve safety. Inagaki and Itoh [31] investigated automating go/no-go decisions using a situation-
adaptive autonomy framework [32]. These publications focused on aiding the flight crew inmaking safe go/no-go decisions during takeoff and did
not consider other LOC risks, such as loss of directional control or inappropriate rotation, which are both case studies in our work.
III. Takeoff
Takeoff is one of the hazardous phases of flight, second only to final approach and landing. Current takeoff regulations require that the flight
crew follow standard operating procedures to configure the aircraft appropriately, obtain clearances, and manually fly the aircraft through initial
departure climb [33]. In a commercial transport aircraft, a typical takeoff ground roll lasts 20–35 s. The Federal Aviation Regulations define
several airspeed checkpoints called V speeds [34,33] to guide the flight crew in making appropriate decisions during takeoff. The most important
V speed isV1, which is the decision speed by which the flight crewmust decide to continue or reject a takeoff, i.e., make a go/no-go decision with
sufficient remaining runway to safely reject the takeoff. The flight crewmay need to reject a takeoff due to several factors such as engine failure(s),
tire burst(s), runway incursion, etc. A rejected takeoff initiated after V1 will leave insufficient runway length to stop safely. Rotation initiated
before the appropriateV speed can result in an early departure stall [15]. Figure 2 graphically represents takeoff V speeds. A listing ofV speeds is
provided in Sec. V (Table 1).
The aircraft takeoff dynamics used in this work are presented in [8] and the Appendices at the end of this paper. However, to study the
longitudinal dynamics of the aircraft during the takeoff ground roll, these equations can be simplified as described in [34]. Let X; Y represent
the longitudinal and lateral runway directions, respectively, with (0, 0) as the ground roll initiation point on the runway centerline. LetV represent
the airspeed and V lof represent the lift off airspeed. The simplified equations can be described as follows:
_X  V cosγ
_V 
(
A1 − B1V2 V < V lof
A2 − B2V2 V ≥ V lof
(1)





























Table 1 Input alphabet symbols for the takeoff Moore machine
Alphabet (Σ) Description
Vmcg Minimum controllable groundspeed with one engine inoperative
V1 Takeoff decision speed (go/no-go speed)
VR Rotation speed
V lof Liftoff speed
V2 Takeoff safety speed
Vfp Minimum flap retraction speed
Tmax Takeoff thrust setting
Tidle Idle thrust setting
c Aircraft configured for takeoff
c 0 Improper takeoff configuration
d Crossing first directional threshold
d 0 Crossing second directional threshold
e Envelope protection deactivated
e 0 Envelope protection activated
f Inadequate acceleration performance
o 0 Stall
θ Positive pitch attitude
θ Maximum allowable pitch attitude reached during rotation
θ 0 Safe rotation attitude































































Here, T represents the takeoff thrust or idle thrust for rejected takeoff (RTO), W represents the aircraft’s takeoff weight, ρ represents the
atmospheric density, μ represents the rolling friction coefficient for continued takeoff or braking friction coefficient for RTO, and γ is the flight-
path angle.We assume γ  0whenV ≤ V lof and γ  γ0 (γ0 > 0) whenV > V lof . The angle of attack is represented by α;Sref is the planform area;
and CLg and CDg are the coefficients of lift and drag, respectively, including ground effects and nominal flaps/slat settings for takeoff.
To investigate FSAM for takeoff, we first examined causal factors in takeoff-related accidents. Ninety-seven rejected takeoff runway overrun
accidents and incidents have been reported from 1960 to 2000, resulting in more than 400 fatalities [1,35]. Takeoff accident causal factors are
summarized in Fig. 3 [36].
The goal of FSAM is to identify LOC risk and assure its mitigation. In this initial work, we make the following simplifying assumptions:
1) There are no electromechanical or structural failures, and all software is functioning according to specification.
2) The control authority and aerodynamics are nominal, indicating no reduction in the flight envelope.
3) The aircraft is cleared for takeoff and faces no risk due to obstacles or other aircraft.
These assumptions would be relaxed in a comprehensive takeoff FSAM beyond the scope of this work.
Below, in Sec. IV, we present envelopes for the takeoff phase that are essential to prevent factors such as improper rejected takeoff decisions,
degraded acceleration performance (due to reduced engine performance or other factors such as weight calculation errors), tail strikes, poor
rotation procedures, and directional control issues.
IV. Takeoff Flight Envelopes
To achieve an effective FSAM capability, we first need to prescribe safe flight envelopes for takeoff. Translational dynamics [Eq. (1)] with













Fig. 2 Takeoff phase of flight.
Fig. 3 LOC contributing factors for takeoff [36].































































Integrating Eq. (3) yields









Using Eq. (4) for a given takeoff configuration (weight, thrust, and flap/slat settings), one can estimate the maximum airspeed at which a
rejected takeoff must be initiated to stop safely within the available runway space. The Fig. 4 vector field illustrates how V and X evolve after a
rejected takeoff is initiated. The solid curve in Fig. 4 defines the partition of the V-X space for which a rejected takeoff will enable the aircraft to
stop safely at or before the end of the runway.
Analogously, one can estimate the minimum airspeed beyond which a one-engine-inoperative (OEI) takeoff can be safely continued (see
Fig. 5). All trajectories to the left of this envelope will overshoot the runway before attaining airspeed V2.
Figure 6 combines the constraints in Figs. 4 and 5 to partition safe regions in the V-X space with respect to RTO and OEI conditions. The
intersection of the two curves represents V speed V1.
When operating with all engines operative (AEO), the aircraft must always stay in an envelope where at least one safe action can be executed.
Figure 7 defines a minimum thrust boundary, assuming AEO to avoid the zone that is unsafe with respect to RTO and OEI. If the aircraft deviates
outside this minimum thrust boundary under the AEO condition before V1, takeoff must be rejected.
Rotational dynamics can be similarly analyzed to segregate safe and unsafe operating regions. For example, Fig. 8 illustrates a constraint on
pitch during rotation. Overrotation leads to tail strike, imposing a maximum tail strike pitch constraint.
Similarly, lateral runway excursions due to poor directional control can be managed by enforcing constraints on lateral motion primitives.
Figure 9 illustrates safety constraints on cross track position Y and heading ψ . Bounds jyj ≤ jy1j and jψ j ≤ jψ1j represent transitions to moderate
risk states for FSAM, whereas either jyj > jy2j or jψ j > jψ2j represent an unacceptable lateral traversal condition.
V. DMM Formulation of FSAM
In this work, the FSAMdecision logic is modeled as a deterministic Moore machine. DMMs are finite-state machines in which each state has a
prescribed discrete output [14]. Also, DMMs aremodular and composable [7,37], and use of a deterministic specification for FSAMwill facilitate
its verification and certification usingwell-established tools inmodel checking,which is a topic studied in anotherwork [38]. TheDMMis defined
below and the FSAM formulation for takeoff is specified.
Fig. 4 Rejected takeoff envelope.
Fig. 5 Takeoff with one engine inoperative.
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Fig. 7 RTO, OEI, and AEO envelopes.
Fig. 8 Tail strike constraints.
Fig. 9 Lateral takeoff constraints to avoid runway excursion.










































Fig. 6 Safe and unsafe regions of takeoff flight envelopes.































































A. Deterministic Moore Machine
A deterministic Moore machine [14,39,40] is defined by the tuple (S, S0, Σ, Λ, T , G), where S represents a discrete set of states, S0 ⊂ S
represents an initial state, Σ is a finite input alphabet, Λ is a finite output alphabet, T ⊆ S × Σ × S represents the set of state transitions, and
G: S × Λ is the output functionmapping each state to a unique output character (control action). For FSAM, inputs fromΣ trigger state transitions.
Outputs ofG represent FSAMcontrol authority decisions. For simplicity, FSAM is split into longitudinal and lateral DMMs to identify associated
LOC risk.
B. Longitudinal Deterministic Moore Machine
The longitudinal takeoff FSAM DMM identifies LOC risk with respect to the longitudinal aircraft state. Takeoff stages are correlated with V
speeds, as shown in Fig. 2. We represent the longitudinal Moore machine Alg by the tuple (Slg, Slg 0, Σlg, Λlg, T lg, Glg), where
Slg  fs1; s2; s3; s4; s5; s6; s7; s8; s9; s10; s11; s12; s13; s14; s15g (5)
Slg 0  fs1g (6)
Σlg  fVmcg; V1; VR; V lof ; V2; Vfp; Tidle; Tmax; c; c 0; e; e 0; f; θ; θg (7)
Λlg  fP;EAg (8)
Glg 

P if si ∈ fs1; s2; s3; s4; s5; s6; s7; s8; s14g
EA otherwise
(9)
Transitions T lg represent edges in a directed state transition graph (Fig. 10). The definition of each alphabet symbol in the set Σlg is listed in
Table 1. Table 2 provides descriptions of each state. A state s ∈ Slg is defined by the triplet  V;P;R. V represents an airspeed range, with values
shown in Eqs. (10–18). Here, P ∈ f0; 1g is a flag set to true when continuing the takeoff is no longer safe because of inappropriate aircraft
configuration; and R ∈ fε; low;med; highg represents the risk level associated with the current state, where ϵ denotes a zero risk state:
V ∈ f vig; i  1; : : : ; 8 (10)
v1  fV ∈ RjV  0g (11)
v2  fV ∈ Rj0 < V ≤ Vmcgg (12)
Fig. 10 DMM for longitudinal takeoff dynamics (see Table 1).































































v3  fV ∈ RjVmcg < V ≤ V1g (13)
v4  fV ∈ RjV1 < V ≤ VRg (14)
v5  fV ∈ RjVR < V ≤ V lofg (15)
v6  fV ∈ RjV lof < V ≤ V2g (16)
v7  fV ∈ RjV2 < V ≤ Vfpg (17)
v8  fV ∈ RjV > Vfpg (18)
Each state s ∈ S is mapped to an output by function Glg.P represents the “pilot-in-control” command, and EA represents the “envelope-aware
autopilot” command output. The output of each state is indicated on the lower half of each state depicted in Fig. 10. This work assumes the
envelope-aware controller has sufficient situational awareness to recover from the LOC triggers/hazards.
As shown in Fig. 10, the aircraft starts from an initial state of rest s1 at X; Y  0; 0. If the aircraft is configured for takeoff c and takeoff thrust
is established Tmax, the aircraft accelerates down the runway and the DMM state transitions through the nominal V-speed state progression.. The
top row of states in Fig. 10 represents the nominal V-speed sequence The additional states represent offnominal conditions with LOC risk. If
the aircraft is inappropriately configured, the DMM enters a configuration warning state s8, inducing a corresponding alert to the crew. If the
configuration problem persists, the DMM transitions into the abort state s13, where it overrides and rejects the takeoff. During the initial ground
roll (Vmcg < V ≤ V1), if the aircraft has inadequate acceleration, FSAM rejects the takeoff f to prevent entry into the Fig. 7 zone that is unsafewith
respect to RTO and OEI. At higher speeds, the DMM monitors crew inputs to avoid premature rotation and tail strike (s4 and s5). After liftoff,
conventional envelope protection features such as angle of attack (stall) and overspeed become active [2,3]. Pushing the aircraft to the stall
boundary during the climb (s6, s7) results in override, with the envelope-aware controller (s11, s12) analogous to stall or envelope protection
capabilities found on existing aircraft. FSAM reverts control to the flight crew after the aircraft is stabilized on climbout.
The DMMmodels presented here are a subcomponent of the FSAM system covering all phases of flight. Consequently, after takeoff, FSAM
switches to a climb DMM that is beyond the scope of this work.
C. Lateral Deterministic Moore Machine
The lateral FSAMDMMensures directional control is sufficient to prevent lateral or crosstrack runway excursions. Directional control loss can
result from high crosswinds or gusty winds, engine thrust asymmetry, and inappropriate rudder inputs. Figure 9 provides partitions on the
crosstrack error and heading error, indicating LOC risk level.
The lateral DMM Alt is represented by the tuple (Slt, Slt0, Σlt, Λlt, T lt, Glt), where
Slt  fs 01; s 02; s 03; s 04; s 05; s 06; s 07; s 08; s 09; s 010; s 011; s 012; s 013; s 014; s 015g (19)
Slt0  fs 01g (20)
Table 2 Examples of state representations
Alg states Representation Alt states Representation
s1  v1; 0; ε s 01  v1; y1; ψ1; g1; ε
s2  v2; 0; ε s 02  v2; y1; ψ1; g1; ε
s3  v3; 0; ε s 03  v3; y1; ψ1; g1; ε
s4  v4; 0; ε s 04  v4; y1; ψ1; g1; ε
s5  v5; 0; ε s 05  v5; y1; ψ1; g1; ε
s6  v6; 0; ε s 06  v6; y1; ψ1; g1; ε
s7  v7; 0; ε s 07  v7; y1; ψ1; g1; ε
s8  v2; 0;med s 08  v2; y2; ψ2; g2;med
s9  v4; 0; low s 09  v3; y2; ψ2; g2;med
s10  v5; 0; low s 010  v4; y2; ψ2; g2;med
s11  v6; 0; low s 011  v5; y2; ψ1; g2;med
s12  v7; 0; low s 012  v6; y2; ψ2; g2;med
s13  v3; 1;med s 013  v7; y2; ψ2; g2;med
s14  v3; 1; ε s 014  v2;3; y3; ψ3; g1;med
s15  v8; 0; ε s 015  v8; y1; ψ1; g1; ε































































Σlt  fVmcg; V1; VR; V lof ; V2; Vfp; Tidle; Tmax; c; c 0; e; e 0; d 0; dg (21)
Λlt  fP;EAg (22)
Glt 

P if s 0i ∈ fs 01; : : : ; s 07g
EA otherwise
(23)
Transitions T lt are shown as edges in the Fig. 11DMMgraph. Each state s 0 is defined as the quintuple  V; Y; Ψ; ϒ;R. V andR are defined as in
DMM Alg. Y represents discretized crosstrack errors, with y1 and y2 defined as in Fig. 9:
Y ∈ f yig; i  1; 2; 3 (24)
y1  fy ∈ Rjjyj ≤ jy1jg (25)
y2  fy ∈ Rjjy1j < jyj ≤ jy2jg (26)
y3  fy ∈ Rjjyj > jy2jg (27)
Ψ represents discrete inertial heading intervals with deviation constraints ψ1, ψ2, also shown in Fig. 9:
Ψ ∈ f ψ ig; i  1; 2; 3 (28)
ψ1  fψ ∈ −π; πjjψ j < jψ1jg (29)
ψ2  fψ ∈ −π; πjjψ1j ≤ jψ j ≤ jψ2jg (30)
ψ3  fψ ∈ −π; πjjψ j > jψ2jg (31)
Fig. 11 DMM for lateral-directional takeoff dynamics (see Table 1).































































ϒ represents lateral acceleration given by
ϒ ∈ f gig; i  1; 2 (32)
g1  f y ∈ Rjj yj ≤ j y1jg (33)
g2  f y ∈ Rjj yj > j y1jg (34)
Directional control constraint violations often arise due to pilot-induced oscillations [16]. If one or more constraint thresholds is violated d,
FSAM logic transfers control to the envelope-aware controller, which then attempts to bring the aircraft within nominal (low risk) bounds. If the
envelope-aware controller is not able to maintain the aircraft within the specified bounds d 0, then FSAM aborts the takeoff.
The overall FSAM DMM for the takeoff is defined by the parallel composition (concurrent execution) of bothAlg andAlt. Although the two
machines (Alg and Alt) have a similar structure, they may not follow analogous transition sequences. For example, in case of an imminent tail










That is, FSAM transfers longitudinal control to the EA controller while retaining directional control with the pilot. This notion of decoupling the
longitudinal and directional control authorities, though convenient from a system design perspective, may or may not be welcomed or easily
understood by flight crews. Analyzing the benefits of a coupled versus decoupled FSAM formulation would require human subject evaluations
beyond the scope of this work. Figure 12 indicates the role of the flight crew and FSAM during takeoff.
VI. Case Studies
In this section, we present case studies to illustrate and evaluate use of FSAM for takeoff. Each case study is based on accident data obtained
from the flight data recorders.
A. Loss of Directional Control in Continental Airlines Flight 1404
The behavior and effectiveness of FSAM’s takeoff DMMwere first analyzed using a case study based on the Continental Airlines Flight 1404
accident [16]. Due to severe crosswinds during takeoff, the Boeing 737 veered off the side of the runway after the pilot failed to maintain
directional control. Figure 13 illustrates relevant parameters extracted from the flight data recorder (FDR). After 10 s, the aircraft veered away
from the runway heading (heading transitions from0 to−30 deg) when the crosswinds exceeded 40 kt. TheNTSBdetermined the probable cause
of the accident as follows “The captain’s cessation of rudder input, which was needed to maintain directional control of the airplane, about four
seconds before the excursion, when the airplane encountered strong gusty crosswind that exceeded the captain’s training and experience.” This is
reflected in Fig. 13, showing that the pilot relaxed the rudder pedals following a large rudder input at roughly 5 s.
Fig. 12 Flight crew and FSAM functions during takeoff.































































To study the behavior of the FSAMDMMfor the Flight (FL) 1404 LOC scenario, a lateral runway excursion accident was simulated using data
obtained from the FL 1404 FDR (Fig. 14). Details about the physical models, the controller design, and the simulation setup can be found in this
paper’s appendices. The results of the simulation are shown in Fig. 15. These plots illustrate the dynamics of an aircraft augmentedwith the FSAM
DMM taking off in a severe crosswind. The FSAM DMM transfers lateral control of the aircraft from the pilot to the EA controller when the
aircraft exits the inner threshold with respect to heading jψ j > jψ1j (see Fig. 15). The envelope-aware controller is able to steer the aircraft back
within the inner thresholds. After the aircraft is stabilized on the initial departure climb, lateral control is transferred back to the pilot. The
execution sequence of the machines is illustrated in Fig. 15. To enable a sensitivity analysis, we also chose different thresholds and crosswind
magnitudes. In each scenario, FSAM consistently rejected the takeoff whenever possible [8].
B. Tail Strike and Runway Excursion: Emirates Airlines Flight 407
On 20 March 2009, an Airbus A340 operated by Emirates Airlines failed to takeoff safely fromMelbourne Airport, Australia [41]. The flight
crew had programmed the flight computer with the wrong weight, which resulted in inadequate thrust application for takeoff. Consequently, the
aircraft overshot the runway during the initial takeoff roll and experienced a tail strike due to overrotation. The subsequent flight was uneventful,
and the aircraft returned for an emergency landing at the same airport. The actual weight of the aircraft was determined to be 362.9 tons, and the
weight entered into the flight computerwas 262.9 tons. Figure 16 illustrates the takeoff envelopes of the aircraft for theweight thatwas entered into














































Fig. 13 Accident data from flight data recorder.
Fig. 14 Simulation setup.































































the flight computer (262.9 tons). If the aircraft was actually loaded at 262.9 tons, it would have followed the trajectory indicated by the solid curve
that lies in the safe region of the takeoff envelope. However, the actual trajectory of FL 407 (362.9 tons) veered into the region that is unsafe with
respect to continued AEO takeoff. FL 407 began the ground roll with a thrust setting appropriate for a lower weight; hence, as seen in Fig. 16, the
aircraft could not achieve a safe liftoff speed V lof before overshooting the runway.
Figure 17 shows the trajectory of the aircraft augmented with both FSAMDMMs. As the aircraft exits the safe envelope with respect to AEO,
FSAM triggers a rejected takeoff and the aircraft is safely brought to a stop.
VII. Discussion
The takeoff FSAMDMMswere able to avoid LOC for the two presented case study scenarios but are not yet complete. Although a DMMwill
only be capable of executing the LOCmitigation sequences for which it has been designed, it would be possible to construct a DMMdatabase that
identifies and reacts to a broad suite of known risk factors, e.g., see Fig. 3. Ultimately, if FSAM encounters a scenario it has not been designed to
handle, FSAM must recognize this or at least ensure the crew remains in charge to handle the situation, which is a capability requiring further
research. Verifying that FSAM never initiates an override in scenarios for which it was not designed will be the key to safety certification.
The DMMs illustrated in this paper were manually constructed. This process is not scalable to all known risks over all phases of flight.
Furthermore, the full suite of FSAMDMMs needs to be collectively verified and validated to assure no unexpected interactions between DMMs
will cause inappropriate FSAM response. We are pursing complementary work in verification to ensure FSAM decisions meet safety
requirements [38].



























































































Fig. 15 Continued takeoff scenarios (case study 1).





































Takeoff with max thrust
Latest no-go decision
Earliest go decision
Trajectory with 362.9 t
with thrust setting for 262.9 t
Trajectory with 262.9 t
Fig. 16 Takeoff trajectories of Emirates Flight 407 (case study 2).
































































This paper has presented a flight safety assessment andmanagement capability that identifies andmitigates risks associatedwith loss of control.
FSAM initially warns the crew of imminent LOC risks. It overrides to an alternate recovery controller if the crew fail to mitigate the risk. FSAM is
formulated as a deterministic Moore machine and applied to the takeoff phase of flight. The FSAMDMMmachines are evaluated on case studies
motivated by real-world aviation accidents and incidents. Results show that a capable FSAM implementation can potentially avert LOC. This
paper contributes a novel formulation to ensure takeoff flight safety using deterministic Moore machines. The nominal sequence of states in the
DMMs have a one-to-one correspondence with the typical V-speed decision sequence on which a pilot is trained. Furthermore, envelopes have
been developed for the takeoff phase that simplify identification of safe and unsafe regions with respect to longitudinal takeoff dynamics. The
takeoff phase in commercial aircraft is the only phase that remains manually flown. Thework presented in this paper can play a significant role in
ensuring manual control is safe.
For a more comprehensive safety management system, hazards associated with conditions such as instrument failures, actuator failures,
structural problems, and other trafficmust also be recognized and handled by FSAM. FSAMmust also be extend to the other phases of flight. The
DMM will ultimately require verification before certification and must be integrated into an informative crew interface display for manned
transport applications. The decision system described in this paper can ultimately be extended to provide a comprehensive and verified means of
avoiding LOC, which is the leading cause of aviation accidents today.
Appendix A: Takeoff Dynamics
This appendix describes aircraft dynamics for takeoff. Modeling ground roll dynamics of the aircraft requires the knowledge of the reaction
forces and moments exerted by the ground on the airframe [43], as well as aerodynamic forces that become significant as airspeed progressively
increases during the takeoff roll.
Aircraft landing gear is modeled as a spring-mass-damper system for each assembly [44,45]. Based on knowledge of inertial position and
velocity of the center of gravity (CG) and attitude of the aircraft, one can estimate the compression and rate of compression of the oleo struts and
then compute the normal forces and moments exerted by the ground on the airframe.
Assuming that the three struts are exactly vertical, the normal force Fz exerted by the ground on the aircraft (expressed in the inertial frame) is
given by
Fzi  −Kizi − Ci _zii  Nw;Lw; Rw (A1)
Ki and Ci are the spring constants and the damping coefficients of the nose, as well as the left and right oleo struts of the landing gear. The
compression and rate of compression of the oleo struts expressed in the inertial frame are z and _z.Nw, Lw, andRw represent the nose, and the left
and right wheels. The gear model is shown in Fig. A1.
Thewheels experience friction due to contact between the tire and runway surface. We assume that the wheels are rigid to simplify the friction
model [46]. Longitudinal forces acting on the wheels are due to the longitudinal slip and the normal forces experienced by the wheels. The





where Vx is the translational velocity of the wheel in the longitudinal direction, ω is angular velocity of the wheel, and R0 is wheel radius
including tire.
The coefficient of friction μ is related to the longitudinal slip ratio σs of thewheels by the empirical formula known as the “magic formula” [47]:
μ  D sin C tan−1 Bσs (A3)
Here, B, C, and D are constants pertaining to the runway surface type. The longitudinal frictional forcesFx exerted by the ground on thewheel
are given by
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Fig. 17 Takeoff trajectory with FSAM augmentation (case study 2).































































Fxi  μiFzi i  Nw; Lw; Rw (A4)






i  Lw; Rw (A5)







Here, u; v are the x; y components of the aircraft velocity in the body frame, respectively. lyi and lxi are the distances of thewheels from the






i  Nw; Lw; Rw (A7)
Here, Fymax is the maximum attainable side force at the optimal slip angle αopt. Fymax and αopt are experimentally derived parameters [44,45]:
FymaxNw  −3.53 × 10−6F2zNw  8.33 × 10
−1FzNw (A8)
FymaxLw;Rw  −7.39 × 10−7F2zLw;Rw  5.11 × 10
−1FzLw;Rw (A9)
αsoptN  3.52 × 10
−9F2zNw  2.8 × 10
−5FzNw  13.8 (A10)
αsoptL;R  1.34 × 10
−10F2zLw;Rw  1.06 × 10
−5FzLw;Rw  6.72 (A11)
The net ground reaction force componentsFx,Fy, andFz can be computed as shown in Eqs. (A1), (A4), and (A7). The momentsMx,My, and
Mz, due to the reaction forces, can be obtained by taking the product of the reaction forces and the respectivemoment arms about the aircraft center
of gravity.
The net ground reaction forces and moments are transformed into the aircraft body frame. The transformed forces and moments can then be
added to the conventional six-degree-of-freedom aircraft equations of motion [48] to obtain the complete nonlinear set of equations that simulate
the takeoff phase of flight. The takeoff equations of motion (expressed in body frame) are given by the following:
Fig. A1 Tricycle landing-gear configuration.
































































m _u − vrwq  −sin θmg − cos βcos αD sin αL cos ϕTFT  Fxgear (A12)
m _v ur − wp  sin ϕcos θmg − sin βD Fygear (A13)
m _w − uq vp  cos ϕcos θmg − cos βsin αD − cos αL − sin ϕTFT  Fzgear (A14)
Rotational momentum:
Ixx _p Izz − Iyyqr − Ixz _r pq  Laero  Lthrust  Lgear (A15)
Iyy _q Ixx − Izzpr Ixzp2 − r2  Maero Mthrust Mgear (A16)
Izz _r Iyy − Ixxpq Ixzqr − _p  Naero  Nthrust Ngear (A17)
Wheel dynamics:
IwN _ωN  FxNRwheelN (A18)
IwL _ωL  FxLRwheelL  τbrakeL (A19)
IwR _ωR  FxRRwheelR  τbrakeR (A20)
Here, u, v, andw represent the translational velocity in the aircraft body frame; andp, q, and r are the body frame angular rates. The roll, pitch,
and yaw angles are ϕ, θ, and ψ ;L andD are the total lift and drag, respectively; FT is the total thrust force; and ϕT represents the angl, the thrust
vector makes with the longitudinal axis. Li,Mi, andNi are the roll, pitch, and yawmoments where i  aero, i  thrust, and i  gear represent
moments induced by aerodynamic, thrust, and gear forces, respectively. Ixx, Iyy, Izz, and Ixz are the moments of inertia of the aircraft; Iw is the
moment of inertia of the wheel; Rwheel is the radius of the wheel; and τbrake is the braking torque produced on the wheels due to the application of
brakes. Equations (A18–A20) model the effect of differential braking during the ground roll [43].
Appendix B: Controller Design
In Sec. VI.A, we used a simple proportional-integral derivative (PID) control framework, as illustrated in Fig. B1. There are two parallel PID
controllers. One actuates the brakes to maintain a zero crosstrack error, whereas the other controller actuates the rudder to track a particular
reference heading. The gains for the two PID controllers were tuned manually. The brake controller was tuned to yield reasonable runway
centerline tracking performance in the low-airspeed regime. The rudder controller was tuned to yield adequate tracking performance in the high-
airspeed regime during takeoff.
The use of differential braking enables the controller to counteract crosswind forces, especially while the rudder is ineffective at low airspeeds.
Figure B2 illustrates the aircraft’s lateral response (crosstrack error) to a constant crosswind of 16 kt under different scenarios. FromFig. B2, it can
be seen that the aircraft veers off the runway due to the crosswind when no control input is applied. With braking input alone (right brake input of
800 N · m), the aircraft canmaintain runway centerline at low airspeeds. At higher airspeeds, braking does not provide sufficient cornering forces
to counteract the crosswind. The rudder input alone is ineffective at low airspeeds; however, as the airspeed increases, the rudder’s effectiveness
increases to provide a sufficient yawingmoment to return to the runway centerline.When rudder and braking are both used tomaintain the runway
centerline, the aircraft can be controlled with very small deviations from the centerline.
Fig. B1 Envelope-aware controller architecture used on the nonlinear aircraft plant.































































Appendix C: Parameters Used
The takeoff weight of the aircraft is 45,420 kg. The inertia properties of the aircraft are Ixx  0.2262 × 107 Kg · m2, Iyy 
0.3172 × 107 Kg · m2, Izz  0.3337 × 107 Kg · m2, and Ixz  −0.15 × 104 Kg · m2. The planform area is 122.4 m2, andwing span is 34.10m.
The mean chord length is 4.194 m. The aerodynamic forces and moments in Eqs. (A12–A17) are obtained from the NASA generic transport
model [49]. The landing-gear parameters are chosen to ensure that the spring-mass-damper model, shown in Eq. (A1), has sufficient damping
characteristics. The spring constants are KLw  KRw  2 × 105 N · m−1, and KNw  4 × 104 N · m−1. The damping coefficients are CLw 
CRw  1.5 × 105 N · s · m−1, and CNw  5.0 × 104 N · s · m−1. Landing-gear offsets from the center of gravity, as shown in Fig. A1, are
lxN  10 m, lxR  lxL  2.932 m, lyL  −3.795 m, and lyR  −lyL. The friction parameters in Eq. (A3) correspond to a dry tarmac runway and
are given by B  10, C  1.9, and D  1. The total takeoff thrust over both engines is 160 kN.
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